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Multi-agent maintenance scheduling based on the coordination
between central operator and decentralized producers in an
electricity market
PEGAH ROKHFOROZ1, BLAZHE GJORGIEV2, GIOVANNI SANSAVINI2, AND OLGA FINK3
Abstract. Condition-based and predictive maintenance enable early detection of critical system conditions
and thereby enable decision makers to forestall faults and mitigate them. However, decision makers also need
to take the operational and production needs into consideration for optimal decision-making when scheduling
maintenance activities. Particularly in network systems, such as power grids, decisions on the maintenance
of single assets can affect the entire network and are, therefore, more complex.
This paper proposes a bi-level multi-agent decision support system for the generation maintenance decision
(GMS) of power grids in an electricity market. The GMS plays an important role in increasing the reliability
at the network level. The aim of the GMS is to minimize the generation cost while maximizing the system
reliability. The proposed framework integrates a central coordination system, i.e. the transmission system
operator (TSO), and distributed agents representing power generation units that act to maximize their
profit and decide about the optimal maintenance time slots while ensuring the energy balance. We consider
predictive maintenance and derive the optimal strategy of the agents via a distributed algorithm, through
which agents make optimal maintenance decisions and communicate them to the central coordinator, i.e. the
TSO. The TSO decides whether to accept the agents’ decisions by considering market reliability aspects and
power supply constraints. To solve this coordination problem, we propose a negotiation algorithm using an
incentive signal to coordinate the agents’ and the central system’s decisions, such that all the agents’ decisions
can be accepted by the central system. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm with
reference to the IEEE 39 bus system.
Indices
t: Index of hour.
k: Index of decision horizon.
n: Index of generation units (agents).
s: Index of scenario path.
j: Index of nodes.
Constants
T : Fixed planning time for maintenance.
N : Number of generation units (agents).
Kn: Number of decision horizons for the maintenance decision-making of agent n.
Sn,k: Number of path scenarios for the second threshold of agent n at decision horizon k.
J : Number of nodes.
Γj: Set of nodes directly connected to node j.
P (t): Electrical market price at time t [ $
MW
].
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2qmaxn : Maximum power output of unit n [MW ].
qminn : Minimum power output of unit n [MW ].
Cn(t): Generation cost of unit n at time t [$].
Lj(t): Load of system at node j at time t [MW ].
Bj,r: Susceptance of line jr [per unit].
Fj,r: Transmission capacity of line jr [MW ].
t1,n,k: First threshold of unit n at decision horizon k.
t2,n,k: Second threshold of unit n at decision horizon k.
rn,k: Repair time of unit at decision horizon k.
ts2,n,k: Second threshold scenario path s of unit n at decision horizon k.
πsn,k: Probability of second threshold scenario path s of unit n at decision horizon k.
αn: Positive constant of unit n [$/h].
γn: Positive constant of unit n [$].
Decision variables
xn(t): Maintenance decision of unit n at time t.
yn(t): Maintenance decision of central system for unit n at time t.
qn(t): Power output of unit n at time t [MW ].
θj(t): Angle of node j at time t [rad].
un(t): Commitment decision of Agent n at time t.
Notations. The function sign( · ) represents the standard sign function as
sign(x) =


1, x > 0
0, x = 0
−1, x < 0.
Let us consider ζ as a stochastic variable, we denote by Eζ{f( · , ζ)} the expected value of function
f( · , ζ) with respect to ζ. We define the column augmentation of xn(t) for t = {1, · · · , T} as xn :=
col(xn(1), · · · , xn(T )) := [xn(1), · · · , xn(t)].
1. Introduction
Traditionally, maintenance actions in power systems have been scheduled in a preventive way, typically with
long planning decision horizons. Maintenance intervals have to strike a balance between system availability,
the impact of failures and maintenance costs [17]. To this aim, condition-based and predictive maintenance
enable to perform maintenance activities only when required, based on the condition of the system and
the predicted evolution of its degradation [2, 7, 36]. However, this decreases the planning decision horizons
significantly due to the short reaction times of these algorithms and entails a complex maintenance scheduling
because of the strong coordination required by the different decision makers. Indeed, the decisions of individual
stakeholders affect the operations of the whole power network.
The goal of maintenance scheduling is to maximize the reliability of the system. One major challenge
associated with maintenance scheduling in network systems, like power grids, is that the decision makers
need to comply with system constraints. The main constraint of the power grid in the electrical market is
the instantaneous balance of power. Making a trade-off between maximizing the reliability and balancing the
power demand plays a significant role in the maintenance scheduling of generating units. Several research
studies have addressed the trade-off between maximizing reliability and load balancing using an optimization
approach, agent-based modelling and incentive signals solutions [31, 24].
In this paper, we propose a bi-level negotiation algorithm in the context of predictive maintenance between
the central coordinating system and decentralized power generating agents using incentive signals. Our
proposed framework is specifically targeting predictive maintenance decisions, which enable agents to perform
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the reliability of the system is preserved and corrective maintenance costs are avoided. However, the agents
have only a limited time window to make their decisions. Within the framework of predictive maintenance,
we assume that the remaining useful lifetime (RUL) of a generating unit can be predicted and the associated
uncertainty estimated. We develop a model for the agents’ objective functions, which is based on the expected
deterioration cost and on the revenue that the agents obtain from the energy production. In addition, to
ensure power balance, we propose a negotiation algorithm where agents submit their optimal maintenance
time slot to the central system. Agents’ decisions are rejected by the central system if the load fulfillment
cannot be satisfied during the time period of the maintenance. We develop a maintenance optimization
model for the central system which strikes a balance between the proximity to the end of life prediction of the
individual plants and the need to satisfy the load balance at the system level. If the agents’ decisions cannot
be accepted, the central system sends an incentive signal to encourage the agents to adjust their proposition
of the maintenance time slot before failure. The procedure iterates until the convergence occurs, i.e. the
adjusted decisions of all agents can be accepted by the central system. The proposed mechanism provides a
weak budget balance during the negotiation process, i.e. during negotiations, since the agents pay a penalty
to the central system, its revenue is positive. This indicates that the mechanism of incentive signals by the
central system does not add overheads to the market mechanism. Indeed, this is the main feature that a
mechanism design solution (negotiation algorithm) should possess [16]. Moreover, in the convergence point of
the algorithm, the proposed algorithm is fully budget balanced which means that the revenue of the central
system is zero. Furthermore, our simulation results show that the expected rewards of the agents are positive
during the convergence process. Hence, the proposed induced mechanism is individually rational for each of
the agents. This means that the agent will participate voluntarily in the mechanism under the assumption
of rationality.
In the proposed approach, the agents decide about their maintenance decisions in a decentralized way,
while, in most of the previously proposed approaches [33, 27, 3, 6, 35, 26, 14, 8, 23, 1], the optimization
problem is solved in a centralized way. Moreover, the proposed framework not only ensures reliability, it also
makes sure that the generation meets the demand by proposing a negotiation algorithm between the agents
and the central system. This process is often disregarded in previously proposed approaches [25, 21, 19, 13].
Furthermore, the proposed framework implements decentralized decisions and negotiation mechanisms in
contrast to previous approaches that address the predictive maintenance scheduling of power generating units
[38, 37].
The proposed framework comprises three main contributions, which go beyond the state of the art of
induced incentives, namely:
(1) We propose a decentralized framework that is suitable for predictive maintenance, while the previous
studies which propose a negotiation algorithm [5, 22, 9, 34] do not consider predictive maintenance
modelling.
(2) The proposed induced mechanism is weakly budget balanced during the negotiation and is fully budget
balanced in the convergence point of the algorithm. This overcomes the limitations of the previously
proposed approaches [22, 9, 34] which are not budget balanced.
(3) The proposed approach is individually rational. While also the mechanism proposed in [5] is budget
balanced, the individual rationality of the agents, which is one of the most important features of
incentive mechanisms, was not investigated.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that a multi-agent maintenance scheduling framework
based on the coordination between central operator and decentralized producers in an electricity market is
proposed in the context of predictive maintenance using the negotiation algorithm approach which is budget
balanced and individually rational.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A review of the related work is given in Section 2.
The basics on remaining useful life (RUL) prediction are introduced in Section 3. We present the framework
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system’s objective function is introduced in 5. Section 6 represents the coordination procedure among agents
and central system using an incentive signal. The case study is introduced in Section 7. The simulation
results are shown in Section 8. The concluding remarks are made in Section 9.
2. Related work
Centralized generation maintenance scheduling. The optimization approach for the maintenance
schedule of power generating units in an electrical market system has been implemented in different ways. A
method for optimal maintenance scheduling based on genetic algorithms has been proposed in [33, 27, 3]. A
meta-heuristic approach for the optimal maintenance scheduling of generation units using reliability-based
objective function is presented in [6]. Furthermore, a method for joint optimization of generation scheduling
and preventive maintenance has been elaborated in [35, 26]. The goal of the optimization model proposed in
[35] is to minimize the total cost including production cost, preventive maintenance cost, minimal repair cost
for unexpected failures and tardiness cost. The authors of [26] propose a multi-objective optimization model
to maximize the profits of selling electricity and maintaining the system reserves. The generation scheduling
from the point of view of the central system is formulated in [14, 8, 23], which can be solved using linear and
nonlinear mixed integer programming approach. All of these research studies achieve an optimal solution of
the maintenance optimization in a centralized manner. In other words, the generating units do not decide on
their maintenance independently. The authors of [1] address the predictive maintenance scheduling problem
using a centralized optimization approaches which works based on the decision tree and mixed integer linear
programming. Their maintenance schedules are solely determined by the central system. This centralized
approach may result in high computational costs.
Decentralized generation maintenance scheduling. In addition to solving the maintenance schedul-
ing as a central optimization problem, several research studies formulate the maintenance scheduling problem
in a decentralized way, where agents decide on their maintenance scheduling based on individual objective
functions. In [25], an agent-based approach is proposed to maximize the system reliability while considering
the load balance as a constraint. A bi-level optimization approach is developed in [21] where agents maximize
their rewards in the first level and the central system clears the market in the second level. In [19], the authors
propose a decentralized robust optimization approach which leads to an increase of system performance and
reliability. A stochastic maintenance scheduling is proposed in [13], where agents choose their maintenance
decisions and the TSO makes a final decision by considering the system’s reliability and its constraints. All of
these research studies do not consider any negotiation or coordination mechanism between the central system
and the agents.
Generation maintenance scheduling based on incentives or penalty signals. Several research
studies have also addressed the generation maintenance scheduling based on incentives or penalty signals.
The authors of [5] propose an incentive signal which ensures an appropriate level of reliability. In this paper,
the central system obtains the maintenance scheduling using an optimization approach to maximize the
reliability and minimize a cost function. Moreover, each agent seeks to maximize its objective function that
conflicts with the goal of the central system. This challenge is solved using a coordination mechanism based on
an incentive signal. The maintenance scheduling of generating units based on game theory is proposed in [22].
The authors consider a competition among agents using game theory and develop a coordination mechanism
using an incentive signal to align the objective function of the agents with that of the central system. In [9],
a novel mechanism that balances between the benefits of the agents and the system reliability is proposed.
In this paper, the agents submit a set of maintenance bidding costs to the central system by considering
unexpected events of unit failures. The central system schedules the maintenance which satisfies the system’s
energy demand. Then, the central system sets the final expenditure to make a coordination mechanism.
In [34], a further coordination mechanism to maintain the central system reliability while maximizing the
benefits of agents is proposed. One of the limitations of the previously proposed mechanisms is that not all
5of the mechanisms are budget balanced. Furthermore, the individual rationality of the agents decisions is not
ensured in the previous studies [5].
Generation maintenance scheduling in the context of predictive maintenance. Predictive main-
tenance has typically not been considered in the maintenance scheduling problems. The focus has been mostly
on the combination of corrective and preventive maintenance. However, there are some research studies that
address the generation maintenance scheduling considering predictive maintenance modelling. The authors of
[38, 37] propose a mixed-integer optimization model for generation maintenance scheduling using the informa-
tion of generators’ health data. Moreover, the proposed approach co-optimizes the generation maintenance
scheduling and the unit commitment.
3. Predicting the remaining useful life (RUL)
Remaining useful life (RUL) is the amount of time, in terms of operating hours, cycles, or other measures
in which the component will continue to meet its design specification [20]. RUL estimation is an essential
part of prognostics and health management (PHM) of industrial systems. Prognostics estimate the lifetime
of the specific component in its specific operating environment and are not solely based on the average
system behaviour. Several directions have been proposed for estimating the RUL that fall into the three main
categories [20, 10]: (a) model-based or physics-based approaches, i.e. combining typically two parts: modelling
the underlying physics of a component/subsystem and modelling physics of damage propagation mechanisms;
(b) data-driven approaches that are based on condition monitoring data [32]; (c) knowledge-based approaches
that rely on domain expert judgements.
Since the estimation of the RUL involves predicting the future behavior of industrial assets, it implies
several sources of uncertainty that influence the future prediction. Therefore, it is rarely feasible to estimate
the RUL with complete certainty and RUL cannot be considered as deterministic [29].
The prediction of RUL, therefore, typically also involves the quantification of the uncertainty associated
with the specific prediction [29, 11, 28]. Different approaches have been proposed to estimate the uncertainty
of the RUL prediction and combine the different sources of uncertainty [30]. Indeed, the estimation of the RUL
does not prevent the failure of the component before the predicted end of life (EoL). In this paper, we assume
that we can detect the onset of a fault and can subsequently predict the RUL with the associated uncertainty.
We can, therefore, assume that the probability distribution of the estimated uncertainty is known.
4. The proposed negotiation mechanism
The proposed bi-level multi-agent system for the maintenance decision support aims at minimizing the
generation cost while maximizing the system reliability in terms of generation adequacy. The framework
integrates a central coordination system, the transmission system operator (TSO) and distributed agents rep-
resenting power generation units that act to maximize their profit and decide about the optimal maintenance
time slots while ensuring the power demand balance.
The mechanism consists of three main steps which enforce the reliability and the power demand balance:
(1) Each agent considers its failure time as a stochastic random variable and decides on the maintenance
time slot for a fixed period of time (xn, n in N = {1, · · · , N}), depending on the expected rewards
that it obtains by generating the power and the expected cost of maintenance. Based on this, the
agents submit their decisions (bids) to the central system.
(2) The central coordinating system is responsible for the reliability at the network level and the load
balance. Hence, if accepting all of agent decisions does not guarantee the power balance, the central
system selectively accepts the bids of the agents that are close to the failure time and rejects other
bids which is expressed as (yn, n ∈ N ) in Figure 1.
6(3) Since the agents will fail if no maintenance is performed within the specified time period and incur into
failure costs, the central coordinating system encourages them to change their decisions by providing
them with an incentive signal (In, n ∈ N ) which is explained in Section 6.
The schematic of the proposed mechanism is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Negotiation schematic between power generating agents and the central coordi-
nating system.
5. Problem formulation
5.1. Stochastic deterioration cost
In this research study, we assume a setup where generation units are equipped with condition monitoring
devices, which can detect the fault initiation. We assume that the failure behaviour of the components is
not dominated by continuous gradual degradation but rather by faults that can be detected by the condition
monitoring system. After the detection, the remaining useful lifetime is predicted based on the current system
state, the predicted evolution of the detected faulty system condition and the future operating profile. The
maintenance action should be then performed within the detected fault initiation and the predicted failure
time. To model the increasing deterioration and the increasing failure probability of the component after the
detection of the fault, we introduce a fault progression penalty.
We consider T as the maintenance scheduling time consisting of Kn = {1, · · · ,Kn} decision horizons for
each of the agent n ∈ N . The decision horizons of agent n ∈ N are defined as follows
T1,n = {1, · · · , t1,n,1},
Tk,n = {t1,n,k−1, · · · , t1,n,k}, k ∈ {2, · · · ,Kn − 1}
TKn,n = {t1,n,Kn−1, · · · , T}.
where t1,n,k defines the fault initiation of agent n, at decision horizon k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N .
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which is a random variable with a known distribution function and is equivalent to the failure time of the
generation unit n at decision horizon k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N . Since the fault progression is typically nonlinear,
we model the penalty costs between the fault detection and the end of life as an exponential function. t1,n,k
is the starting time to impose a fault progression penalty on agent n at decision horizon k, n ∈ N , k ∈ Kn.
The fault progression cost can be modelled as follows:
DCn =
∑
k∈Kn
∑
t∈Tk,n
Et2,n,k
{(
1− xn(t)
)
αne
(t−t1,n,k)
(
sign (t− t1,n,k)− sign(t− t2,n,k)
))}
.
(1)
Equation 1 implies that if agent n does not perform a maintenance action after the fault initiation t1,n,k,
then it receives a penalty cost. Moreover, the unit will fail if the agent does not perform maintenance before
the failure time. In this case, no deterioration cost is imposed on the agent after that point. In other words,
the agent is penalized by the fault progression cost between t1,n,k and t2,n,k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N , which is modeled
by
(
sign (t− t1,n,k) − sign(t− t2,n,k)
)
. Furthermore, since t2,n,k is a random variable, we use the expected
fault progression cost for agent n, n ∈ N . Since the agents seek to minimize their fault progression cost, the
penalty function (1) based on the value of αn encourages agent n, n ∈ N , to perform maintenance before the
failure time. It is determined by the central system and is the fixed failure cost term independent of time, .
5.2. Agents’ objective function
The generating units determine the maintenance time slots by maximizing their expected reward functions.
The agents are price-takers, i.e. they generate revenues by providing the capacity to meet the power demand.
Each agent’s objective function comprises two parts: 1) the sum of the expected gain from the generated
power over the time decision horizon, which is computed by subtracting the sum of the generation costs from
the revenues, and 2) the expected fault progression cost.
We model the expected reward function of agent n, n ∈ N , as follows:
Rn =
∑
k∈Kn
∑
t∈Tk,n
Et2,n,k
{(
1− xn(t)
)(1
2
(
1− sign(t− t2,n,k)
)(
P (t)qn(t)− Cn(t)
))}
.
Equation 5.2 implies that if agent n, n ∈ N , performs maintenance at time t (xn(t) = 1) its revenue is
zero, because it cannot produce power. Furthermore, when agent n, n ∈ N , does not perform maintenance
before its failure time, it will fail in the sense that
(
1 − sign(t − t2,n,k)
)
= 0 and its generation and revenue
become zero as well. It is important to note that the failure time is a random variable. Therefore, the sum
of the expected rewards from the agent’s generated power is considered.
For each agent n ∈ N , the decision-making process can be formulated as an optimization problem:
max
xn
∑
k∈Kn
∑
t∈Tk,n
Et2,n,k
{(
1− xn(t)
)(1
2
(
1− sign(t− t2,n,k)
)(
P (t)qn(t)− Cn(t)
)
− αne
(t−t1,n,k)
(
sign (t− t1,n,k)− sign(t− t2,n,k)
))}
s.t. C1 : xn(t) ∈ {0, 1}, t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, k ∈ Kn,
C2 : xn(t+ 1)− xn(t) ≤ xn(t+ rn,k − 1), t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, k ∈ Kn,
C3 : 1 ≤
∑
t∈Tk,n
xn(t) ≤ rn,k, k ∈ {2, · · · ,Kn},
(2)
where xn = col(xn(1), · · · , xn(T )). Constraint C1 denotes that the maintenance decision is a binary variable
and xn(t) = 1 indicates that agent n decides to perform maintenance at time t. Constraint C2 quantifies the
8amount of time needed for maintenance actions known as the repair time. Constraint C3 enforces that agent
n performs maintenance between t1,n,k−1 and t1,n,k in each decision horizon k just once, which lasts rn,k time
units at maximum.
Due to the stochastic nature of t2,n,k, the optimization problem is also stochastic. To tackle it, we assume
that t2,n,k has a finite number of possible realizations. Hence, we consider Sn,k = {1, · · · , Sn,k} scenarios for
the second threshold t2,n,k and the probability of scenario s is π
s
n,k, s ∈ Sn,k, n ∈ N , k ∈ Kn. Hence, the
optimization problem (2) can be cast as a mixed integer linear programming problem:
max
xn
∑
k∈Kn
∑
t∈Tk,n
∑
s∈Sn,k
{(
1− xn(t)
)(πsn,k
2
(
1− sign(t− ts2,n,k)
)(
P (t)qn(t)− Cn(t)
)
− αne
(t−t1,n,k)
(
sign (t− t1,n,k)− π
s
n,k sign(t− t
s
2,n,k)
))}
,
s.t. C1, C2, C3.
(3)
5.3. Central system’s objective function
The central system coordinator, i.e. the TSO, maximizes the system’s reliability while fully supplying
the power demand. The central system has a coordinating function. It cannot change the agents’ decisions
but only provide incentives to motivate them to change their decisions. This formulation corresponds to
the setup in real applications where power generating agents are independent stakeholders and take their
decisions independently of any central coordinating system.
To this end, we propose a framework where the central system prioritizes the decisions of the agents whose
plant is close to t2,n,k, n ∈ N , k ∈ Kn, while ensuring the fulfillment of the energy demand by considering
the network and agents constraints. Hence, we model the central system’s objective as:
max
y,q,θ,u
∑
n∈N
∑
k∈Kn
∑
t∈Tk,n
∑
s∈Sn,k
πsn,k
ts2,n,k − t+ ǫ
yn(t),
s.t. A1 :
∑
n∈Nj
(1 − yn(t))qn(t)−
∑
r∈Γj
Bj,r(θj(t)− θr(t)) = Lj(t), j ∈ J , t ∈ {1, · · · , T},
A2 : yn(t) ∈ {0, 1}, t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, n ∈ N ,
A3 : yn(t) ≤ xn(t), t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, n ∈ N
A4 : un(t)q
min
n ≤ qn(t) ≤ un(t)q
max
n , t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, n ∈ N ,
A5 : un(t) ∈ {0, 1}, t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, n ∈ N ,
A6 : −Fj,r ≤ Bj,r(θj(t)− θr(t)) ≤ Fj,r, r ∈ Γj , j ∈ J , t ∈ {1, · · · , T},
(4)
where y = col(y1, · · · ,yN), and yn = col(yn(1), · · · , yn(T )), n ∈ N . q = col(q1, · · · ,qN), and qn =
col(qn(1), · · · , qn(T )), n ∈ N . u = col(u1, · · · ,uN), and un = col(un(1), · · · , un(T )), n ∈ N . θ =
col(θ1, · · · , θJ), and θj = col(θj(1), · · · , θj(T )), j ∈ J .
ǫ ≥ 0 is a small constant value which avoids the infinity of the optimization and makes it computationally
tractable. Constraint A1 ensures that power demand is satisfied at each bus (node) given the maintenance
decisions of each unit. Constraint A2 indicates that the central system’s decision is a binary variable. Con-
straint A3 enforces that the central system just accepts and rejects the agents’ decisions and does not force
them to perform maintenance. Constraints A4 denotes the power generation limit of each agent. Constraints
A5 indicates that the unit commitment decision variable is binary, i.e. it is equal to one if the agent is sched-
uled to be committed in each period of time and is zero, otherwise. Constraint A6 ensures that the flow in
the transmission lines is within the capacity limits. Market clearing is performed using the maximum daily
9demand. Therefore, we can assume that the units will be able to ramp up/down to the required power level
within the time frame of one day.
In order to make yn(t)qn(t) linear, we substitute it with a new variable:
Zn(t) = (1− yn(t))qn(t), (5)
and add the following constraints as the equivalent of the nonlinear term
0 ≤ Zn(t) ≤ (1− yn(t))M
Zn(t) ≥ qn(t)− (1− (1− yn(t)))M
Zn(t) ≤ qn(t) + (1− (1− yn(t)))M,
(6)
where M is a large positive constant [12].
Substituting (5) and (6) into (4), we obtain a mixed integer linear programming optimization:
max
y,q,θ,u,Z
∑
n∈N
∑
k∈Kn
∑
t∈Tk,n
∑
s∈Sn,k
πsn,k
ts2,n,k − t+ ǫ
yn(t),
s.t. A2, A3, A4, A5, A6,
A7 :
∑
n∈Ni
Zn(t)−
∑
r∈Γj
Bj,r(θj(t)− θr(t)) = Lj(t), j ∈ J , t ∈ {1, · · · , T},
A8 : 0 ≤ Zn(t) ≤ (1− yn(t))M, t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, n ∈ N ,
A9 : Zn(t) ≥ qn(t)− (1− (1 − yn(t)))M, t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, n ∈ N ,
A10 : Zn(t) ≤ qn(t) + (1− (1− yn(t)))M, t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, n ∈ N ,
(7)
where Z = col(Z1, · · · ,ZN) and Zn = col(Zn(1), · · · , Zn(T )), n ∈ N .
6. Coordination procedure via incentive signal
For the agent n, time slots for the maintenance action have to be identified in each decision horizon, such
that the TSO accepts the maintenance decision proposed by agent n within the decision horizon. The TSO
accepts the maintenance decision, if the overall system power demand is fully supplied and at the same time
the agent can perform the required maintenance actions on the generating units. Since the objectives of the
TSO and the generating units are partly conflicting, we solve the conflict by introducing a negotiation process
between the agents and the central system using an incentive signal.
In the first iteration i = 1 of the negotiation algorithm, the agents set their decisions based on Equation (3),
and submit them to the central system. The central system solves Equation (7) for making a decision about
whether to accept or reject the agents’ maintenance decisions. If yn(t) = 1 and xn(t) = 1, agent n can perform
maintenance, otherwise the decision of agent n is rejected and yn(t) = 0. In the case that agents’ decisions
cannot be accepted because the power demand cannot be satisfied, the central system sends an incentive
signal to the agents which affects their objective function and motivates them to change their maintenance
decisions in the next iteration of the negotiation algorithm. Without imposing an incentive signal, the agents
whose decisions have not been accepted by the central system cannot perform maintenance before failure and
would fail. Hence, they would not be able to produce power, which is also not in the interest of the central
system. Therefore, an incentive signal is created such that the maintenance decisions of all agents will be
accepted by the central system at some point (iteration).
We define the incentive signal for agent n at iteration i and time t as:
Iin(t) = γnx
i
n(t) sign
( i−1∑
o=1
(
yon(t)− x
o
n(t)
))
, (8)
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where xin(t) indicates the decision of agent n at iteration i and time t, and y
o
n(t) indicates the central system
decision at iteration o. The rationale of the incentive signal is detailed in Section 6.1.
Hence, during the negotiation process at iteration i, the objective function and the optimization problem
for agent n are expressed as:
max
xi
n
∑
k∈Kn
∑
t∈Tk,n
∑
s∈Sn,k
{(
1− xin(t)
)(πsn,k
2
(
1− sign(t− ts2,n,k)
)(
P (t)qn(t)− Cn(t)
)
− αne
(t−t1,n,k)
(
sign (t− t1,n,k)− π
s
n,k sign(t− t
s
2,n,k)
))}
+
T∑
t=1
Iin(t),
s.t. C′1 : x
i
n(t) ∈ {0, 1}, t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, k ∈ Kn,
C′2 : x
i
n(t+ 1)− x
i
n(t) ≤ x
i
n(t+ rn,k − 1), t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, k ∈ Kn,
C′3 : 1 ≤
∑
t∈Tk,n
xin(t) ≤ rn,k, k ∈ {2, · · · ,Kn},
(9)
where xin = col(x
i
n(1), · · · , x
i
n(T )).
The negotiation algorithm for the maintenance decision is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Negotiation algorithm for maintenance decisions
1: Input: x0n(t) = 0, y
0
n(t) = 0, n ∈ N , t = {1, · · · , T}.
Iterate:
2: For n ∈ N repeat until convergence:
3: Obtain xin(t) using Equation (9), t = {1, · · · , T}.
4: Obtain yin(t) using Equation (7), t = {1, · · · , T}.
5: If yin(t) 6= x
i
n(t), t = {1, · · · , T}, calculate incentive signal using Equation (8).
6: i← i+ 1.
6.1. Rationale of the proposed incentive signal
If the maintenance decision of agent n cannot be accepted by the central system at iteration i, the agent
will receive −γnxin(t) as a penalty function in every iteration after i. Since the agent seeks to maximize
its objective function, it will likely change its maintenance decision. Additionally, if the agents’ decision is
accepted by the central system at time t in iteration i, then the incentive signal is zero at time t in iteration
i+ 1. Hence, if the agents obtain their maximum reward at iteration i by choosing the maintenance decision
at time t, the same decision is also made in iteration i+ 1. Namely, agents are not forced to make the same
decision in subsequent iterations However, the agents choose the same decisions through the optimization
because they are optimal for them.
The developed coordination framework embraces the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. The repair time rn(k), k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N is sufficiently small with respect to the decision horizon
time. In the worst case where t1,n,k and t
s
2,n,k, s ∈ Sn,k, are equal for all the agents:
ts2,n,k − t1,n,k ≥ N max
n∈N
(rn,k), s ∈ Sn,k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N .
Assumption 2. If one agent can perform maintenance, the power demand is satisfied by the remaining
operating agents. In other words, if agent m 6= n, m ∈ N , n ∈ N , decides to perform maintenance at time
t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, we have ∑
n∈N ,n6=m
qmaxn ≥ L(t).
Assumption 1 and 2 are not too conservative in real power systems. Since agents are heterogeneous, the
worst-case that t1,n,k and t
s
2,n,k, s ∈ Sn,k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N are equal for all the agents is not realistic due to
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the individual variability of the operating conditions and differences in system configurations. Moreover, the
failure rates are typically small due to the high requirements on system availability and safety. Therefore, it
is reasonable to assume that the repair time is small relative to ts2,n,k − t1,n,k. Furthermore, in most of the
real electricity markets there is sufficient overcapacity. Hence, when just one agent performs maintenance the
power demand can be satisfied.
The following lemma imposes a condition that guarantees that when the agents’ decisions cannot be
accepted by the central system, the agents will change their decisions at the next iteration.
Lemma 1. Consider xin(t) and y
i
n(t) as the maintenance decision of agent n and the central system at time
t and iteration i of the algorithm. In the case that xin(t) is not equivalent to y
i
n(t), x
i+1
n (t) will not be equal
to xin(t) if we have:
γn ≥ max
(
0, max
t∈Tk,n,k∈Kn
∑
s∈Sn,k
{(
−
πsn,k
2
(
1− sign(t− ts2,n,k)
)(
P (t)qn(t)− Cn(t)
)
+ αne
(t−t1,n,k)
(
sign (t− t1,n,k)− π
s
n,k sign(t− t
s
2,n,k)
))})
, n ∈ N .
(10)
Proof. If xin(t) is not equal to y
i
n(t), it means that x
i
n(t) equals to one, hence the agent n gets −γn as the
penalty function. We can conclude that a rational agent n will not choose xi+1n (t) = 1 if it gets a lower reward
than xi+1n (t) = 0 (a different decision would not be rational). Hence, this results in:
−γn ≤ max
t∈Tk,n,k∈Kn
∑
s∈Sn,k
{(πsn,k
2
(
1− sign(t− ts2,n,k)
)(
P (t)qn(t)− Cn(t)
)
−αne
(t−t1,n,k)
(
sign (t− t1,n,k)− π
s
n,k sign(t− t
s
2,n,k)
))
.
(11)
We ensure that Equation (11) holds if we have
γn ≥ max
t∈Tk,n,k∈Kn
∑
s∈Sn,k
{(
−
πsn,k
2
(
1− sign(t− ts2,n,k)
)(
P (t)qn(t)− Cn(t)
+ αne
(t−t1,n,k)
(
sign (t− t1,n,k)− π
s
n,k sign(t− t
s
2,n,k)
))}
, n ∈ N ,
since γ should be positive, so (10) must be satisfied. 
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 converges, in the sense that
lim
i→∞
yin(t) = x
i
n(t), t = {1, · · · , T}, n ∈ N .
Proof. Lemma 1 ensures that agents whose decisions cannot be accepted by the central system will change
their decisions at the next iteration. In addition, Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that there is sufficient time
between ts2,n,k and t1,n,k, s ∈ Sn,k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N , such that all the agents’ decisions can be accepted by the
central system at the end of the negotiation process. 
6.2. Budget balance
Definition 1. (Budget balance) The negotiation mechanism is budget balanced if the cumulative amount of
incentives/penalties that the central system has to pay or receive from the agents in every iteration of the
algorithm would be equal to zero [15]. This condition is expressed by:
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
Iin(t) = 0.
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Definition 2. (Weak budget balance) The negotiation mechanism is weak budget balanced if the cumulative
amount of penalties that the central system gets from the agents is larger than the cumulative amount of
incentives that it pays to the agents. In other words, the revenue of the central system is positive [18]. It can
be expressed as follows:
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
Iin(t) ≤ 0.
In the proposed algorithm, at each iteration yin(t) ≤ x
i
n(t) and, therefore, I
i
n(t) ≤ 0, n ∈ N , t = {1, · · · , T}.
Hence, we can deduce that our mechanism has a weak budget balance.
Moreover, if xin(t) cannot be accepted by the central system at iteration i, then, agent n receives the
incentive signal Ii+1n (t) = −γnx
i+1
n (t) at iteration i + 1, n ∈ N , t = {1, · · · , T}. Using Lemma 1, we make
sure that xi+1n (t) = 0 Therefore, I
i+1
n (t) = 0, n ∈ N , t = {1, · · · , T}. Furthermore, since every agent’s
decisions are accepted at the convergence point, denoted by i∗, using Theorem 1, we can conclude that
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
Ii
∗
n (t) = 0.
Hence, our mechanism is budget balance at convergence.
7. Case study
The developed algorithm is applied to the IEEE 39 bus New England system [4]. The system consists of
39 buses, 29 lines, 46 branches of which 12 transformers, and 10 generating units with the total generating
capacity of 7367 MW. The yearly load curve with peak demand of 6254 MW and minimum demand of 3026
MW is used (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. A yearly demand curve for the IEEE 39 bus system.
8. Results
The results of the maintenance algorithm are shown for a period of 365 days with 50 scenario paths
(Sn,k = 50), k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N , for the remaining useful life which is a random variable. In particular, the
13
Table 1. The first threshold and second threshold distribution parameters
Agent t1,n,k τn,k σn,k
1 [55, 172, 290] [115, 251, 380] [6.67, 6.56, 5.45]
2 [31, 132, 226, 282] [91, 185, 258,360] [5.06, 6.92, 5.77, 5.15]
3 [48, 152, 266, 363] [109, 201, 306, 396] [6.32, 6.95, 5.89, 6.23]
4 [22, 125, 200, 272] [82, 165, 241, 320, 400] [5.74, 5.44, 6.27, 6.39, 5.25]
5 [24, 115, 186, 273] [84, 161, 239, 324, 416] [6.28, 5.20, 5.03, 5.32, 6.05]
6 [54, 173, 283] [114, 236, 371] [5.14, 6.70, 6.39]
7 [37, 159, 217, 301] [97, 178, 272, 365] [5.48, 6.09, 6.32, 6.88]
8 [42, 125, 244, 363] [102, 212, 330, 435] [5.59, 5.63, 6.33, 5.23]
9 [49, 157, 264, 363] [109, 224, 335, 450] [5.88, 6.53, 6.81, 6.76]
10 [58, 173, 304, 417] [118, 247, 349, 457] [5.61, 6.59, 5.81, 5.77]
Table 2. Incentive signals for agents [$]
Agent’s number Iteration 1 Iteration 2 Iteration 3
7 -200,000 0 0
10 -800,000 -400,000 0
uncertainty of the RUL prediction for agent n is assumed to obey a normal distribution with mean τn,k and
standard deviation σn,k. The values of the first threshold t1,n,k and the parameters of the normal distribution
for second threshold t2,n,k for different decision horizons for all the agents are displayed in Table 1.
Remark 1. The selected values of t1,n,k and τn,k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N , shown in Table 1 exemplify relatively large
failure rates for each agent. This selection allows demonstrating the negotiation process in the simulation
results for the size of the test system. Nonetheless, the proposed coordination algorithm can account for
planning decision horizons of several years.
The convergence of the decision making process of the agents and central system at each iteration of the
algorithm are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 shows that the decisions of agents 7 and 10 are not acceptable for the central system in the
first iteration of the algorithm (Figure 3(a)). In this case, the two generating units would fail if they do not
perform maintenance in each decision horizon. Therefore, we introduce an incentive signal which encourages
the agents to change their decisions. Indeed, in the next iteration, agents 7 and 10 change their decisions,
such that the central system accepts the decision of agent 7 (Figure 3(b)) rejects the decision of agent 10.
The negotiation is, therefore, repeated until the convergence is reached. Finally, all the agent’s decisions are
accepted by the central system in the last iteration as shown in Figure 3(c). Therefore, we can conclude that
the algorithm converges and after all decisions are accepted the agents’ decisions will not change. Figure 4
shows the maximum available capacity during the iterations of the negotiation process.
Figure 4 shows that during the first and second iterations of the algorithm the available capacity that
agents can fulfill is less than the load of the system. Hence, the central system cannot accept the maintenance
decisions of all the agents. At the third iteration, the available capacity made by the agents’ decisions is
higher than the power demand. Therefore, all the agents’ decisions are accepted.
We compare the incentives or penalties of agents whose decisions could not be accepted in at least one
iteration (agents 7 and 10) in Table 2.
Table 2 shows that agents 7 and 10 receive the penalty function in iteration 1 because their maintenance
decisions could not be accepted. Then, in the second iteration, agent 7 modifies its decisions and does not
need to pay the penalty to the central system and its decisions can be accepted. However, in the second
iteration agent 10 receives a penalty function since its decision is rejected by the central system. At iteration
14
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Figure 3. Maintenance decisions of each of the 10 agents and the central system (a) at the
first iteration (b) at the second iteration (c) at the third (final) iteration when the algorithm
converges. The dashed vertical lines for agent 10 in panel (a) and (b) indicate the mean value
τ10,k of the failure time distribution for agent 10.
Table 3. Expected rewards of the agents during negotiation [$]
Agent’s number Iteration 1 Iteration 2 Iteration 3
7 503,800 704,100 704,100
10 662,900 1,054,000 1,455,800
3, the algorithm converges and agents receive no penalties anymore. Hence, based on results reported in
Table 2, the revenue of the central system during the negotiation is positive. Therefore, the mechanism is
weak budget balanced. At iteration 3 (convergence point), the summation of the incentive signals is zero and
the mechanism is budget balanced.
We compare the change of achieved rewards for agents 7 and 10 in each iteration of the algorithm during
the negotiation process in Table 3.
Table 3 shows that the rewards of the agents increase during the negotiation since in each iteration after
they receive the incentive (penalty) signal, they change their decisions such that the penalty signal decreases
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Figure 4. Fulfilled capacity during the negotiation process (a) at the first iteration (b) at
the second iteration (c) at the third iteration.
in the next iteration. Moreover, the rewards of all these agents are positive, even when they get a negative
incentive signal. We can infer from these positive rewards that the agents will participate in the negotiation
algorithm voluntarily, assuming that the agents are rational, since they get positive rewards instead of no
rewards when they do not participate in the negotiation. Hence, our proposed incentive signal scheme has
the individual rationality feature.
8.1. Comparison of the proposed algorithm to the baseline decisions
The results of the proposed algorithm are compared against the baseline solutions where agents decide
about their maintenance in each decision horizon at t1,n,k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N . This corresponds to the condition-
based maintenance scenario where failures are detected but no remaining useful lifetime prediction can be
provided, t2,n,k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N are, therefore, not known. Moreover, we compare the results of the proposed
algorithm with the maintenance decision at τn,k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N where the units have high failure probability.
This scenario corresponds to the scenario of corrective maintenance. While both scenarios (condition-based
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Figure 5. Maintenance decisions at t1,n,k (condition-based maintenance scenario) and τn,k,
k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N (corrective maintenance scenario), (the decisions of agents 4 and 5 at τn,k
would not fulfill the load. The dashed vertical lines for agents 4 and 5 indicate the mean
values τ4,k and τ5,k of the failure time distributions for agents 4 and 5.)
and corrective) are displayed in one figure, it is important to note that the maintenance is performed only
once either at t1,n,k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N or at τn,k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N .
The decisions of agents at t1,n,k and τn,k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N , are shown in Figure 5.
We compare the rewards of the agents for the three analysed cases: decisions at t1,n,k (condition-based),
τn,k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N (corrective), and based on the proposed negotiation algorithm (Figure 6). Figure 6 shows
that the agents’ rewards with the proposed negotiation algorithm are larger than or equal to the rewards in
the other two cases, (assuming that their decisions are accepted by the central system). This outcome is
expected because the agents’ decisions in the negotiation algorithm are based on the optimization approach
which maximizes their rewards (Equation (3)). However, when the agents decisions cannot be accepted by
the central system and the agents receive an incentive signal, their decisions do not maximize the reward
functions (Equation (3)). Therefore, the reward could be smaller than the rewards that they would obtain by
the decision at t1,n,k or τn,k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N . Agent 10 is the agent who gets the incentive signal and, hence,
its rewards is smaller than the reward for the decisions at t1,n,k and τn,k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N .
It is important to point out that the baseline decisions are not an efficient method to obtain the maintenance
scheduling since some of the agents’ decisions cannot always be accepted by the central system as shown in
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Figure 6. Comparison of the rewards in the three cases: Negotiation algorithm, condition
based decision t1,n,k, decision at τn,k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N .
Figure 5, i.e. the maintenance decisions of agents’ 4 and 5 cannot be accepted by the central system. In this
case, they would fail and would not get any reward. Please note that the penalties that would be imposed
for the case that the generating units are failing and the demand would not be able to be fulfilled are not
explicitly considered in this research. This would be the case for units 4 and 5 in Figure 6: the central system
would not accept those maintenance actions since the demand would not be able to be fulfilled. However,
since it is the corrective maintenance scenario, the generating units do not have a choice when to perform
maintenance. The maintenance needs to be performed after the failure occurred.
8.2. Impact of the number of scenarios Sn,k and of the standard deviation σn,k of RUL
In this subsection, we study the effect of the number of scenarios Sn,k and of the standard deviation,
k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N of the uncertainties associated with the RUL predictions, on the total expected reward of all
agents. For the standard deviation σn,k, k ∈ Kn, n ∈ N , of the normal distribution of the uncertainty for
the RUL predictions, we consider three ranges, i.e. [1; 3], [5; 7] and [10; 12], which represent low, medium and
high values. The resulting total expected rewards are 8.83e+06 $, 8.80e+06 $ and 8.74e+06 $, respectively,
when we have 50 scenarios. Hence, the expected reward decreases about 2% value range as the standard
deviation increases. In other words, the increasing uncertainty of the predictions, i.e. the increasing standard
deviation, decreases the expected reward.
Furthermore to analyze the impact of the number of scenarios Sn,k, we consider the medium range for
the standard deviation and 10, 50 and 100 scenarios. The resulting total expected rewards are 8.74e+ 06 $,
8.80e + 06 $ and 8.80e + 06 $, respectively. When the number of scenarios increases, the expected reward
increases about 1% value range and saturates at approximately 50 scenarios, after which the agents rewards
do not increase significantly. Hence, increasing the number of scenarios of RUL prediction improves the
uncertainty description and increases the expected rewards. This effect is consistent with the effect of reducing
σn,k on the expected reward. Indeed, a minimum number of scenarios is required to achieve a sufficiently
accurate representation of the RUL prediction distribution. However, when the number of scenarios increases,
the computational time also increases. As an example, using 10 and 100 scenarios entails a computation time
for each iteration of 330 s and 3310 s, respectively.
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9. Conclusions
We propose a novel bi-level negotiation framework to solve the generation maintenance scheduling problem
in the context of predictive maintenance where remaining useful lifetime (RUL) can be predicted with an
estimated uncertainty. Within this framework, we propose a model for the agents’ objective function which
allows the maintenance actions to be obtained based on the expected reward and fault progression cost. One
of the main contributions of the paper is the proposed incentive mechanism for power generating units. The
proposed incentive mechanism ensures that the power generation will meet the demand while being budget
balanced at the convergence point. Furthermore, the proposed incentive mechanism has the property of being
individually rational for each of the agents. These two properties make the proposed algorithm particularly
attractive for for real applications: a) ensuring that the central coordinating system is not imposed with any
additional overhead costs; b) ensuring that it is rational for each of the power generating units to participate
in the negotiation process.
Our simulation results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism results in better performance in compar-
ison to the base-line decisions such as the purely condition-based maintenance or the corrective maintenance.
It would be also interesting to test the proposed algorithm in larger and more complex networks with more
agents and more coordination requirements.
As future research work we plan to extend the proposed algorithm to electrical markets with high penetra-
tion of renewable energy sources, where the amount of power generated by the generators is uncertain.
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